In many Sub-Saharan African countries, farmers typically have a choice between selling their products to traders who travel between villages and markets and transporting their products to the nearest market themselves. Because of communities' remoteness and poor communications with marketplaces, farmers' uncertainty about market prices is usually high. Traders may take advantage of farmers' ignorance of the market price and extract a rent from them by oering very low prices for their products. In this article, we model bargaining interactions between a farmer and a trader who incur dierent transportation costs, and we study how price information aects the bargain and the balance of power. We then estimate the causal eect of a Market Information System (MIS) working through mobile phone networks on Ghanaian farmers' marketing performances. We nd that farmers who have beneted from the MIS program received signicantly higher prices for maize and groundnuts: about 12.7% more for maize and 9.7% more for groundnuts than what they would have received had they not participated in the MIS program. These results suggest that the theoretical conditions for successful farmer use of MIS may be met in eld.
Introduction
The price that smallholders receive for their agricultural products has great implications for poverty alleviation. Increased protability for farmers may lead them to change their production, investment, and marketing decisions: they may farm land more intensively, sell in larger quantities, invest in productive assets, adopt new agricultural technologies, move land out of nonagricultural use, switch crops, or engage in spatial arbitrage (Jensen, 2010) . In many Sub-Saharan African countries, farmers typically have a choice between selling their products to traders who travel back-and-forth between villages and markets or transporting their products themselves to the nearest market (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005) . Many farmers opt for trader pick-up, despite the fact that traders may take advantage of a farmer's ignorance of the market price, seeking to extract a rent from them by oering very low prices for their products (Fafchamps and Hill, 2008; Mérel, Sexton, and Suzuki, 2009 ). Previous studies have examined how farmers decide whether or not to participate in the market (Goetz, 1992; Key, Sadoulet, and Janvry, 2000; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006) , as well as how they choose between trader pick-up and market delivery when selling their products (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005) . A common feature of these studies is that they focus on transportation costs as the main determinant in marketing decisions. One reason for this is that transportation costs are known to be very high in sub-Saharan Africa, 1 making them a critical component in a farmer's marketing decisions. Information about market prices is another key determinant. Yet, farmers usually lack information about current market prices because of villages' remoteness and poor communications with marketplaces. When analyzing the role of transaction costs in the farmer's decision to sell to the trader rather than at the market, Fafchamps and Hill (2005) assume that the farmer must choose between receiving a lower price at the farm gate and receiving a higher price at the market yet incurring a transaction cost. The fact that the farmer does not have the necessary price information to engage in optimal trade or arbitrage is relatively poorly investigated. Now that most African farmers have the opportunity to use mobile phones for marketing purposes (Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Goyal and González-Velosa, 2012 ), a relevant research question would seek to better understand of how price information aects bargaining and the balance of power in the farmer-trader relationship.
1 Recent studies indicate that transportation costs are much higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions (Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009 ). It has also been noted that transportation costs over short distances, for example, from the farm to the local market, are much higher than long-distance transportation costs, presumably because the vehicles are smaller and road quality is poorer (World Bank, 2009 ). In addition, it appears that West African countries often have a relatively well-connected road network compared to East Africa (Dorosh, Wang, You, and Schmidt, 2010) .
While in 1999 only 10 percent of African people had mobile phone coverage, by 2008 over 65 percent of the population had access to this service. It is often argued that mobile technology is likely to considerably reduce the search costs faced by farmers. With mobile phones, farmers obtain price information for the cost of sending a text message or making a call. This should cause traders visiting farmers at the farm gate to raise the price they are willing to pay for farmer products, an outcome which would result in a welfare transfer from traders to farmers. This accounts for why, along with the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) boom, Market Information Services (MIS) working through mobile phone networks have emerged in some developing countries.
These MIS are provided by private companies from ICT sectors such as mobile network operators or software developers, and sometimes by governments. They oer their users market information services, such as SMS alerts on current market prices.
2 In Ghana, an Accra-based private company has operated a MIS called Esoko since 2008. This new generation of MIS marks an advancement over previous services 3 because it provides users customized and detailed price information on a weekly basis (USAID, 2010) . This article seeks to understand how MIS can lead to farmers receiving higher prices for their agricultural products.
We begin our study by modeling the bargaining interactions between a farmer and a trader.
Related to the work of Fafchamps and Minten (2012) , the question we aim to tackle here is: how much would an informed farmer receive in terms of price gain compared to a situation in which he was uninformed, having no price information? Our model describes a two-player, two-period, oer-oer schema with asymmetric information. We set the assumptions of the model based on observations from our eld work as well as the literature. The bargain between the farmer and the trader occurs at the farm gate in a nite sequence of two periods over the course of a day, reecting the fact that the trader who visits the community in the morning has the opportunity to stop again in the afternoon on the way back. The bargaining procedure is modeled as a sequential game: the trader always begins the negotiation by making an oer, which the farmer either accepts or rejects. The farmer does not know the district market price unless he subscribes to the MIS, while the trader is always fully informed. When negotiation fails, the trader seeks another farmer while the rst farmer travels to the 2 There are several examples of companies providing SMS-based market information services in developing countries:
Manobi in Senegal, CellBazaar in Bangladesh, KACE in Kenya, and Reuters Market Light in India.
3 During 1980s, MIS in Africa were centrally managed by government departments or projects, and were mainly aid-funded. Such MIS operated primarily through information boards or radio programs. This rst generation of MIS often faced nancial and technical diculties which undermined the proper functioning of the system, aecting information reliability and timeliness. district market to sell his products; here we assume that a lack of storage space compels him to sell (Al-Hassan, Dorward, and Poulton, 1999) . The current market price is exogenous to the players and may be high or low. The total amount of agricultural products supplied each year is uncertain due to uncontrollable exogenous elements such as weather (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001) . When the farmer does not subscribe to the MIS, he assigns a probability to each possible state of the market price.
Finally, in line with previous studies, traveling to the market is costlier for the farmer than for the trader. Indeed, in our study area, farmers must usually walk or cycle as a means of transportation.
While some may aord to hire a private transport as some traders do, this practice was reported by none of farmers interviewed in our sample. They may also make use of public transportation, carrying along their bag of maize on a tro-tro, 4 however this was not reported as a common practice either.
In contrast, the trader transports the products in a cost-ecient fashion, as he owns his own pick-up truck.
We solve the game by backward induction and compare the equilibriums reached with and without MIS. If the market price is high, the model predicts that the individual gain to the farmer from being informed is positive. The reason for this is that the uninformed farmer assigns a non-zero probability to the low-price state, which the trader exploits by oering a low price. This does not occur when the farmer is informed, as it forces the trader to make higher oers to secure the deal. Symmetrically, if the market price is low, the model predicts that the individual gain for the farmer from being informed is negative. This is because the uninformed farmer assigns a non-zero probability to the high-price state while the market price is actually low. In order to secure the deal, the trader is forced to oer a higher price compared to the situation in which the farmer is informed. In this case, asymmetric information can even lead to a deal failure as soon as the protability condition of the trader no longer holds. Such a situation never occurs when both agents are informed.
We test the model's prediction that information results in positive individual gain for the farmer using original survey data collected in the Northern region of Ghana after the crop season 2009-2010, a year in which the prices of agricultural products were higher than in previous years (see Figure x) . Our study examines the causal eect of a mobile MIS-based program on farmers' marketing performances in Northern Ghana. We thus add new empirical results to the growing literature on the impact of mobile-based MIS's impact on farmers. We apply the dierence-in-dierence matching estimator to our data and nd that farmers who have access to a mobile-based MIS received signicantly higher 4 In Ghana, tro-tros are minivans that can transport up to twenty passengers. to a considerable reduction in sh market price dispersion, the complete elimination of waste, and near-perfect adherence to the Law of One Price.
The second category is comprised of papers concerned with the impact of MIS on surplus sharing. Similar to our research question, these papers study the impact of information on farmers' bargaining power. In the case of a large private buyer of soybeans in India who invested in Internet applications that allow farmers to access market price information from Web kiosks, Goyal (2010) shows that the introduction of the kiosks lead to a 1-3% increase in farmer prices and a 33% increase in prot.
In this framework, farmers initially sold their soybeans in local wholesale markets to traders who possessed price information across markets, while the farmers did not. This analysis thus highlights the pure market power eect, by which price information simply increases competition without any change in net welfare gain. Svensson and Yanagizawa (2009) address the market power issue more directly by estimating the impact of a radio-based MIS on Ugandan farmers. They show that access to market information strongly improves farmers' bargaining power at the farm gate. Specically, having access to a radio in districts where the MIS project was launched is associated with a 15 percent higher farm-gate price. To our knowledge, the rst evaluation of a mobile-based MIS has been conducted recently by Fafchamps and Minten (2012) . Running a randomized controlled trial to test whether Indian farmers who are MIS users obtain higher prices for their agricultural output, they nd a zero impact. However, as the authors underline in their conclusion, larger impacts are possible in other contexts, in particular in less competitive and more segmented markets where farmers sell a substantial share of their produce. Accordingly, another contribution of our paper is to provide one of the rst impact evaluations of a mobile-based MIS in an African context. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we model bargaining interactions between a farmer and a trader aiming to reach a deal at the farm gate. Second, we present the data used for the empirical analysis.
Finally, we present the results of the econometric analysis and our conclusions.
2 The model
Preliminaries
We consider the bargaining of an agricultural transaction between a farmer and a trader. The farmer, denoted by subscript F, produces an agricultural good. He admits limited storage capacity and can either sell his production at the farmgate or at the market, which can be the nearest market, an assembly market or a more distant market such as the district market. Traveling to the market is costlier for the farmer than for the trader. Indeed farmers must usually walk or cycle, while the trader transports products using a pick-up truck. Some farmers may aord to hire a private transport, as some traders do, while others make use of public transportation, carrying along their bag of maize on a tro-tro minivan. However neither of these means is reported asa common practice in our study area. We denote c the transportation cost incurred by a farmer when traveling to the market, and m the transportation cost incurred by the trader, with m < c. The trader, formally denoted by subscript T , buys agricultural goods from the farmer at the farm gate and then sells these goods at the market. Note that we do not consider any bargaining over the quantities sold as do Svensson and Yanagizawa-Drott (2010) . Without loss of generality, the price we refer to in the model is the price for buying the entire amount of product oered by the farmer. We suppose there is no limit on the quantity that can be bought from a single farmer.
5 We denote the market price as p m and we assume that, due to transportation and transaction costs, this price is necessarily higher than the farmgate price p. As for the farmer, we assume the trader expects the transaction to be protable, meaning that he accepts a deal if it covers his transportation cost. 6 5 In practice, the trader may well refuse a portion of the products in the last community he visited, but we ignore this particular situation.
6 Note that we can also consider that the trader accepts any protable deal such that it covers his transportation costs as well as an additional premium he expects to receive from the deal. Adding this premium in the model is straightforward and the reader interested in this interpretation may consider that m denotes the transportation cost of the trader plus this premium.
The bargaining between the two parties takes place at the meeting point close to the farm and because, by assumption p m ≥ p + m and m < c, a Pareto improving agreement always exists for the two players. Though the two agents share a common interest to make a deal, they have conicting ideas over how to make it. While the trader prefers buying at the lowest possible price, the farmer prefers to sell at the highest possible one. In other words, the two agents conict over the price p they seek agreement upon and therefore over how to share the rent.
We now look at the variables that may aect price p during bargaining. First, we consider the farmer's production cost. By assumption, a farmer never sells goods at a lower price than his cost.
Producing and selling crops ought to be protable, and the farmer accordingly has a reservation price which we denote s. By assumption, we consider that s ≤ p m − m, meaning that we assume a protable deal between the farmer and the trader does exist. Second, we assume the market price to be exogenous to our model, meaning that the success or the failure of negotiations as well as the terms of the transaction do not aect it. Conversely, the market price p m is a key determinant of the farm gate price as it delineates the trader's transaction possibilities. Third, the bigger the gap between m and c, the larger the set of protable transactions. The fourth variable to be considered is the relative bargaining power of the two agents. Bargaining skills and the existence of credible threats to end negotiations may aect the bargained price. Finally, both agents are subject to impatience and prefer an immediate deal to a postponed deal. We set a discount factor δ to measure this impatience, where δ ∈ [0, 1]. The lower this factor, the more impatient and the lower the utility due to a transaction delay.
Formally, the objective functions of two agents who meet at the community market may be written as:
By assumption, the larger the trader's net benet p m − m − p t from making a deal, and the faster this deal is achieved, the greater the trader's utility. Conversely, the larger the price obtained and the lower the production cost, the greater the farmer's utility. Note that all variables are exogenously set besides p t .
Strategies and information structure
We suppose that the bargaining between the two agents takes place in a nite sequence of two periods within a day. Although a general model with n periods might be desirable in theory, we reject this feature because the bargaining we study does eventually occur in a limited number of periods.
7 The trader visits a community twice a day on his trip. He passes by each village on his round-trip journey and may stop again on his way back if his truck has not been lled.
The trader can make several deals at the same meeting point but we assume that all negotiations are independent from each other. Indeed, the price one farmer receives does not aect the price received by the next farmer because, as we shall see, the trader makes oers based on parameters that are specic to each farmer.
We suppose that the farmer and the trader meet once in the morning and once in the afternoon.
In accordance with qualitative evidence from eld, the trader always begins the negotiation by making an oer. The farmer can then either accept or reject this oer. If he accepts, the two agents make a deal and the trader gives p 1 to the farmer for buying his entire production. If p 1 is insucient, the farmer may reject the oer. By assumption, the farmer does not make a counter oer, and rejection in the rst period means that the bargain is postponed until the afternoon.
8 In this last case, the farmer incurs the additional cost c but he will benet from a higher price p m . Additionally, his utility will be discounted because he will not be able to reach the market immediately.
When the bargain is postponed, the utilities of the two agents are discounted according to their respective discount rates. Discounting is particularly relevant for farmers. Those who are more isolated are particularly afraid of missing opportunities to sell their products and may therefore be more impatient, displaying a discount factor that may converge toward zero.
When a second bargaining period occurs, the trader makes a new oer. Again the farmer can either accept or reject this oer. If the oer is accepted, the production is sold at price p 2 . If the oer is rejected, the negotiation between the two agents ends and the farmer then travels to the market himself. He incurs the transportation cost c (c > m) but sells his products at price p m . The trader in this case seeks another seller. Because of additional transportation and bargaining costs, we assume that the trader attempts to ll his truck as quickly as possible and is inclined to make any protable deal.
The game we examine is depicted in Figure 1 . According to exogenous elements like weather and the demand curve, the market price can be high (p m+ ) or low (p m− ,) with p m+ > p m− > 0.
Market price variability (namely the low-price state and the high-price state) refers to inter-annual variability. One could argue that farmers may sell their products twice within a crop season, with one transaction at the beginning of the marketing season when prices are low and another one during the lean season when prices are higher. In this scenario, market price variability should be understood as intra-annual variability. However, the fact that the farmer may ignore the state of the market within a crop year seems unrealistic to us. We thus opt for the inter-annual variability setting.
In the absence of price information, the trader knows p m and the farmer does not. In the rst period, he makes an oer p 1 . If the farmer accepts, the bargaining ends and the payos of agents are
The trader never makes an oer such that U T (p 1 , 1) ≤ 0. If the farmer rejects the oer, he can either wait for the trader's second period oer or go to the market by himself. In this last case, the farmer receives
Else, we assume the bargaining continues in the afternoon and the trader makes a new oer p 2 . If agreement is reached in the second period, the payos to the agents are
. By denition, for a deal to be possible, we should have p t such that s ≤ p t ≤ p m − mmeaning that oers must allow both agents to at least cover their reservation prices.
If bargaining ends in disagreement, the farmer sells his products at the market while the trader attempts to make a deal with another farmer. Payos are respectively
and U T (f ail) = 0. We assume this is the worst possible outcome, and it implies that no agent has an incentive to intentionally seek disagreement.
In the case where the farmer does not know the market price p m , we assume that the farmer assigns a probability to types p m+ and p m− based on previous crop seasons he has experienced. This probability is common knowledge, meaning that the trader is aware of it. We write φ t to denote the probability that at period t, market price is high and 1 − φ t to denote the probability that market price is low. In the second period, the probability φ 2 (p 1 ) is conditional on the fact that, in the rst period, the trader oered a price p 1 which the farmer rejected. At period t, the farmer expects the market price to be φ t p m+ + (1 − φ t )p m− .
The action set of the trader corresponds to all eligible oers making the deal protable. We denote this by T which is the set of feasible prices the trader can oer,
strategy for the trader consists of two actions (p 1 , p 2 (.)) where p 1 ∈ T is the rst period oer and p 2 (.) ∈ T is the second period oer, conditional on p 1 being rejected. The action set of the farmer is F = {a, r}, where a denotes acceptance and r denotes rejection of the oer. A pure strategy for the farmer is a couple of actions (F 1 (.), F 2 (.)) where F 1 ∈ F is the best reply to the oer p 1 at the rst period and F 2 ∈ F is the best reply to the oer p 2 at the second period, conditional on the oer being rejected in the rst period.
3 How does MIS aect bargained prices?
Bargained price with MIS We answer this question by rst considering the case where the farmer subscribes to MIS. Both agents are perfectly informed, and this is common knowledge. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the subscription fee and assume the service is free.
9 As usual, we solve the problem by backward induction. Focusing on the scenario in which a price p exists such that the reservation prices of the two agents are fullled, we have:
The farmer's second period equilibrium strategy is easily computed. He accepts oer p 2 if and only if p 2 equals at least p m − c. The trader's second period price maximizes his second period payo given the farmer's second period strategy. He oers p 2 = p m − c, which will be accepted. We then consider the strategy of the farmer in the rst period. In order to maximize his utility, he should
The trader therefore oers:
which the farmer accepts immediately.
9 Note that this is actually the case in the data we collected.
We deduce that when farmers are perfectly informed about the market price and when a protable deal exists between the farmer and the trader, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
Equilibrium with MIS.Given the model parameters, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists:
• The trader oers p 1 = δ F [p m − c] + (1 − δ F )s and the farmer accepts it immediately.
Bargained price without MIS Solving the game with incomplete information involves the use of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. By denition, perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that both agents play their best response given uncertainty, which means that the optimal choices depend on agents'
beliefs. We rst study the second period game when payos are not discounted. Given that the trader always oers a price lower than p m − m, agreement is necessarily welfare improving for him.
When information is incomplete, the farmer accepts oer p 2 if it is a best reply given the subjective probability φ. As shown by Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002) , because the fully informed agent is making the oers, there is no possible revision of the probability distribution from one period to the other at the equilibrium, φ 1 = φ 2 = φ. The trader is perfectly informed and, given φ, makes the minimal oer that is always accepted by the farmer:
for price uncertainty, the farmer expects to do as well as he would if he went to the market himself.
In other words, he is willing to let the trader capture the benets corresponding to the gap between their respective transportation costs.
The trader benets from uncertainty when p m = p m+ but interestingly this is not the case when p m = p m− . This is because, when p m = p m− , the trader must compensate for the optimistic expectations of the farmer in order to secure a deal. Because the farmer believes the market price is high with a positive probability, he is willing to take the risk of going himself to the market if the trader's oer is too low. In order to avoid this situation, the trader concedes a share of his rent to the farmer.
Although a Pareto improving agreement exists, the negotiation may however fail. To illustrate this, let us recall that if the deal fails, the trader gets a zero payo from this transaction failure and seeks to make a deal with another farmer. Therefore, he is willing to oer p 2 = φp m+ + (1 − φ)p m− − c if and only if the utility he receives is positive. We deduce that the trader makes oer p 2 if and only if:
Else, he may make an oer such that U T 0 but this oer will be always rejected by the farmer.
The two agents here end up in a worse situation. We deduce that uncertainty may collapse the agreement when p m = p m− if the leeway between transportation costs is relatively small, if the probability φ is high, or if the price volatility is high. In such cases, the farmer rejects any oer that could possibly be made by the trader because he expects to get a higher payo by selling his products at the market himself. It follows that, in the one-period game, if φ(p m+ − p m− ) > c − m, there is no oer made by the trader that the farmer accepts.
We now consider the two period game and examine the strategy of the agents in the rst period.
If φ(p m+ − p m− ) ≤ c − m, meaning that if sucient margins exist for the trader to secure a protable deal, he always oers:
whenever p m = p m+ or p m = p m− . The farmer always accepts this oer. Conversely, if φ(p m+ − p m− ) > c − m, the probability distribution and the volatility of prices are such that the dierential of transportation costs between the two agents is too small for a deal to be mutually accepted. In this case, the trader either makes an oer which is always rejected by the farmer, or he abandons the bargain and seeks another farmer. This is a negotiation failure. We deduce that in the bargaining game with incomplete information, there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
Equilibrium without MIS. Given the model parameters, a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists:
• If φ(p m+ − p m− ) > c − m, we have a market failure: no protable oer made by the trader can be accepted by the farmer;
and the farmer accepts it immediately.
Remark that the asymmetric information is at the advantage of the trader, who organizes the course of the bargain. The oer scheme is particularly important in producing these results because the sequentiality of periods cannot be used by the farmer to reveal information. In no case can the farmer strategically reject an oer in order to determine whether the market price is p m+ or p m− .
Allowing the farmer to make oers would give him more bargaining power and lead to another rentsharing equilibrium. In the current setting, the trader makes oers that compensate the farmer for his production costs (i.e. his reservation price), considering the cost he would incur if he were to sell his products on the market. The farmer's sole protection is this outside option that warrants him a better deal (i.e. without it, the trader would oer a price which would cover s). This is the only threat the farmer can use in order to capture a share of the rent. Notice that oers are independent of the trader's characteristics.
MIS versus no MIS
Comparing equilibriums with and without subscription to MIS allows us to derive two principal insights. A rst insight regards the impact of information on the occurrence of a market failure. Although in our setting a Pareto improving deal always exists, asymmetric information about the market price may well lead the two agents to a negotiation failure. In this case, the trader loses his time and gets a zero payo, and the farmer goes to the market by his own means, ending up in a worse situation than the one he would have been in by accepting the deal. In order to make theoretical predictions about the impact of MIS on market prices, consider the mapping f such that f = p 1 − p 0 . When market price is high, we have:
and when market price is low, we have:
We deduce the following result:
Result 2. Farmer's use of MIS is benecial when market price is high and detrimental when market price is low.
An important insight is that inter-annual price variability is the key factor in determining whether MIS has a positive or negative impact on the farmer. When market prices are high, farmers benet from obtaining information about market prices because it impedes the trader from taking advantage of their ignorance about the state of the market. Based on experience from past years, farmers assign a positive probability of (1 − φ) to the low price occurrence, and the trader exploits this wrong expectation in order to capture an additional share f + of the surplus. The trader oers a price p 0 < p 1 and the farmer accepts this oer because he is not aware that he could obtain a higher utility by going to the market himself. This is the standard mechanism by which the trader is able to take advantage of the farmer's ignorance of market prices. When market price is low, price uncertainty works in the opposite way and allows for the farmer to capture an additional share f − of the surplus.
Because the farmer assigns a probability of φ to the high market price state, the trader has no other choice than to concede a share of his surplus in order to secure the deal. Notice that the variability of prices aects the magnitude of f . The bigger p m+ − p m− , the bigger |f |. If variability is high, a farmer's uncertainty about market prices is also high, making information even more benecial when market price is high and detrimental when market price is low. Notice also that p 0 increases with φ.
Said dierently, when the probability assigned by the farmer gets closer to one, the farmer benets less from price information.
Finally remark that adding risk aversion to farmer's preferences increases the positive impact from MIS. Considering a risk premium π to farmer's utility as in Fafchamps and Minten (2012) translates in our setting as increasing the transportation cost of the uninformed farmer by this premium. Knowing that the farmer is risk averse, the trader makes an oer accounting for it. Formally, it follows that adding risk aversion to our model does not aect p 1 but lowers p 0 such that ECAMIC project, since they were not members of ECAMIC communities (though they lived in the same districts). Since the entire population of non-users was quite large, we focused on composing our sample from communities that resembled the users' communities in two respects: they were the same distance from the nearest local markets and they had a similar percentage of literate farmers. In practice, once the villages have been selected on the basis of the geographical criteria, the enumerators went door-to-door in a random manner until they obtained the number of literate respondents that had been set for each community. 14 12 In most densely populated parts of the zone, crop residues of legumes (especially groundnut) are sold or traded for other goods (Karbo and Agyare, 2002). 13 We call these indirect users because at the time we surveyed the second-wave participants, they had recently been trained and set up for automatic SMS alerts on prices. Thus they were not actively participating in the program during the 2009 marketing season, though they lived in the same neighborhoods as other users.
14 We surveyed a proportion of non-user literate farmers that was close to the proportion of literate farmers in users' groups. Given that an average of 60% of farmers are literate in users' groups (120 among 200), we also surveyed 120 Table 2 and 3 describes information collected in the survey on the characteristics of the farmers and of their main transaction for maize and groundnut at the rst point of sale, which is the meeting point where all of the farmers from the local community meet the trader who visits the village.
15
The main transactions happen to occur in the post-harvest period because farmers do not have any place where they are able to store their products. Each farmer in the sample grows at least one of these products (maize or groundnuts). The table reports mean values for various farmer characteristics.
The average number of hectares of cultivated area is 15 acres. The average non-agricultural income is 600 GHS, although only half of the sample depends solely on agriculture for their income. We observe that the range of prices collected for these products (Table 3) The matching approach is widely used when evaluating development programs (Todd, 2008) . The main concerns in assessing the impact of development programs are related to the fact that such programs are not oered at random and that participants self-select into them. The crucial issue is literate farmers in non-user communities. This means that the enumerators went door-to-door in these communities until they obtained 120 literate respondents and 80 non-literate respondents. The can you read question in the questionnaire was thus the screening question.
15 Typically, the trader announces his arrival in the community by honking.
thus to determine what factors are likely to drive both participation in the Esoko program as well as farmers' marketing performances. Although we did not nd qualitative evidence suggesting that the NGO which supported the program had intentionally targeted farmers who marketed larger surpluses or living in more isolated communities, we can reasonably expect that farmers who self-selected into the program felt comfortable using mobile phones and were relatively market-oriented farmers to begin with, though smallholders nonetheless. Moreover, we know that the NGO had been working in this area for a long time, running various projects often involving the same communities. To the best of our knowledge, at least two initiatives of the NGO that run in conjunction with the Esokobased program can be considered confounding factors in our framework. First, participants in the Esoko-based program are also members of a credit union. Second, as members of the NGO, these farmers may also have opportunities to sell their products as a group. We use matching estimators to eliminate selection bias due to farmers' characteristics and possible participation in other programs.
Matching eliminates selection bias due to observable factors X by comparing treated farmers to observationally identical untreated ones (Imbens, 2004) . Because, even after conditioning on observables factors X, there may be systematic dierences between informed and uninformed farmers' outcomes that could lead to a violation of the identication conditions required for matching, we choose to apply the dierence-in-dierence matching estimator, as dened in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) . This estimator allows for temporally invariant dierences in outcomes between informed farmers and their X-matched uninformed counterparts, since at least two observations per individual are available. It requires that E(p 0 Another key assumption for the validity of the DID matching approach is that the treatment received by one farmer does not aect the outcome of another farmer. This assumption is referred to as the Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value-Assumption in the statistics literature (Rubin, 1978) . In our framework, the validity of this assumption could be threatened in two ways. First, treated farmers may share Esoko price information with untreated farmers. Second, Esoko price information may have market equilibrium eects, aecting outcomes of both informed as well as uninformed farmers.
Regarding the rst issue, we do expect some information to diuse between members of the same community, which is why we include the second-wave participants in the treated group as well. On the contrary, spillovers between communities are less likely because communities are somewhat scattered in space, which may cause interactions and informal networks to be weaker across communities.
Indeed, our data conrm that spillovers within communities are much larger than spillovers across communities: among 200 non-users living with Esoko-users in the same communities, 190 farmers stated that somebody they know had provided them price information that was obtained from their phone (in all cases, this information provider happened to be an Esoko-user), while among 200 nonusers living in dierent communities, albeit still in the neighborhood, only 55 farmers stated that they had beneted from such information (the information provider happened to be an Esoko-user in 38 cases out of 55). We thus do not fear the contamination of the control group, since treated and untreated farmers live in separate communities. Regarding the market equilibrium issue, as long as informed farmers do not change the quantity that will be brought to the market (by the trader or by themselves), we should not expect market prices to be altered. However, previous studies in other African countries show that informed treated farmers may actually alter the quantities they sell and/or exert an arbitrage opportunity, thus altering the overall market price on the assembly market and thereby changing the prices paid to farmers in untreated communities (Svensson and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2010) . We test this assumption in our data and fail to detect a signicant change in the sold proportion of the total harvest quantity of informed farmers (see next section).
We use the nearest-neighbor matching estimator (Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens, 2004) , the kernel-based matching estimator, and the local linear matching estimator (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) .
The general form of the DID matching estimator is:
with
where I 1 denotes the group of treated farmers, I 0 denotes the group of untreated farmers, n 1 is the number of treated farmers in I 1 . S P denotes the common support, or the subset of treated farmers for whom the density of observationally identical untreated farmers is higher than some cut-o level (Todd, 2008) . Matching estimators dier in how matched untreated farmers are selected through the matching procedure. This dierence is driven by the weights λ ij that we assign to potential matches given their characteristics X. The nearest-neighbor matching estimator we use in the analysis matches each certied farmer to the four closest uncertied farmers according to the vector X. It is important that the covariates X are not aected by the treatment (Imbens, 2004) , which is why we use values from 2008-2009, assuming that they will not yet be aected by the program on the exact date that it starts. We apply the matching procedure to the summary statistic P r(w i = 1|X i ), the so-called propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . We use the asymptotically-consistent estimator of the variance of the nearest-neighbor matching estimator provided by Abadie and Imbens (2006) , and we implement a bootstrap procedure (500 repetitions) to obtain an estimator of the variance of the kernel matching estimator and of the local linear matching estimator.
Another, computationally easier, way to generate an estimate of the ATT is to regress w on y, controlling for X, by using ordinary least squares. However, in addition to the assumption of linearity, this requires us to assume that the gain associated with the program is constant across X, meaning that the impact of the program is the same for all informed farmers. Without any evidence for such assertion, we thus opt for the widely-used matching approach, which does not require specifying the functional form of the outcome equation and relaxes the assumption of constant additive treatment eects across individuals. We nevertheless run linear regressions as a robustness check.
Results

Impact of the program on the treated
We apply the matching procedure to the ECAMIC group of farmers (the treated group) and to the group of farmers who did not benet from the ECAMIC project (the untreated group). The treated group also includes the group of farmers who entered the program under Prestat funding. Since they entered the program after the marketing season under study, they cannot be considered part of the treated group; however, because they reside in the same communities as ECAMIC farmers, neither can they be considered part of the untreated group because of highly potential spillovers within communities.
Conditional probabilities for participation in the program are computed by estimating a probit model where the dependent variable is w and which includes all covariates X as regressors. We include in vector X the farmer's age, his level of education (a dummy which takes on the value of one if the farmer can read), his experience as a farmer (in years), the distance he lives from the nearest market (in km), the distance between the community and the district market (in km), the farmland (in acres), the total area under cultivation (in acres), the area under cultivation for maize, cassava, groundnut, and yam (in acres), the number of livestock (cattle, goats, pigs, poultry, and sheep), whether or not he owns a radio (a dummy which takes on the value of one if yes), and the total value of his non-agricultural income (in Ghanaian Cedi, GHS).
These propensity scores are rst used to dene the common support, i.e. the subset of treated farmers for whom the density of untreated farmers with a similar propensity score is high enough.
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The graph of the distribution of propensity scores suggests that densities are high enough for a wide range of propensity scores (Figure 4 ). The matching procedure is considered successful when signicant dierences of covariates X among the treated and matched-untreated are removed. We test the balancing property following the algorithm proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002) and conclude that it is satised.
17 Table 4 gives the estimated AT T in terms of price premium for maize and groundnut, the two products for which we have a large enough number of observations. Informed farmers received about 46 GHS for a maxi-bag of maize, which is 5.2 GHS more than the control group. They also received 85 GHS for a maxi-bag of groundnuts, i.e. about 7.5 GHS more than the controls. This means a 12.7%
gain for maize and a 9.7% gain for groundnuts, compared to a situation without price information.
Discussion on selection bias
The specic context in which the farmers of our sample were oered access to price information requires that we further investigate whether confounding factors drive our estimations. Indeed, treated farmers may also benet from access to credit via the credit union. In the case where farmers use 16 To do so, we apply the standard procedure as described in Todd (2008) : after excluding points for which the estimated density is zero, we exclude an additional small percentage of the remaining points for which the estimated density is positive but very low. Our estimated cut-o density is 0.077 and the trimming level is 0.006. The nal number of treated farmers on the common support is 328 (out of 332).
17 Becker and Ichino (2002) 's algorithm splits the sample into k equally spaced intervals of the propensity score. Then within each interval, the algorithm tests that the average propensity score of the treated and control units does not dier. If the test fails in one interval, it splits the interval in half and tests again. In our analysis, the nal number of blocks is six. This procedure ensures that the mean propensity score is the same for the treated and controls in each block. Results of the test indicate that all covariates are balanced except three (distance between the community, the district market in block ve, and two variables of livestock in block six).
credit to buy inputs such as seed and fertilizers, they are more likely to produce higher yields. This may translate to larger transactions and consequently higher prices, since buyers who travel to them reduce transaction costs 18 and may consent to buy at a higher price. If this is true, our estimates would be biased upward. Moreover, farmers may also use credit to buy food or pay school fees. No longer under a liquidity constraint, they would be able to better negotiate prices in this scenario. If this is true, here again our estimates would be biased upward. Data indeed suggest that only a small share of treated farmers declare not having access to credit (14%), contrary to untreated (47%), as shown in Table 5 . Moreover, it seems that credit is mainly invested in equipment or inputs. We thus control for this potential credit union eect using additional covariates when running the matching procedure, namely the total credit used for equipments (in GHS), the total credit used for seeds and fertilizers (in GHS), and the yield level observed in 2009. Finally, our results appear very similar to previous ones (Table 7) . We apply the matching estimators to the sold quantity as a proportion of the total harvest quantity for each product and fail to detect any signicant impact. Taken together, these results provide some evidence that access to the credit union does not play as a confounding factor in our setting.
Data also suggest that some treated farmers (20%) mainly sell their produce as a group, while untreated farmers almost never do. This may inuence our estimates, again because the traders who travel to the farmers reduce their transaction costs when large quantities are available. We control for this potential collective marketing eect by adding a dummy that takes on the value of one in the set of covariates. However, this does not yield dierent results compared to previous estimates.
We take this to be evidence that there is no selection bias driven by a collective marketing eect (Table 8) .
Conclusion
Although the potential for mobile-based MIS in agricultural development seems important, analyses of the conditions for its positive impact on farmers' marketing performances are rather scarce, as are empirical impact evaluations. In this article, we model bargaining interactions between a farmer and a trader and we study how information aects the bargain and the balance of power. We elicit 18 The traders who buy small quantities must bear the cost of sorting and grading each parcel in order to match it with parcels of similar quality goods. They may also have to weigh and re-pack the product and transport it to another market.
conditions for MIS to improve farmers' marketing performances and demonstrate how information aects a farmer's decision to sell at the farm gate rather than at the market. An unexpected result of the model is that providing price information to the farmer allows him to avoid negotiation failure with the trader while Pareto improving deals exist. Regarding cases when deals do occur, the model shows that the impact of price information is positive when the market price is high and negative when the market price is low, an important nding given the high volatility of market prices. Next, we use a quasi-experimental approach relying on survey data about farmers' transactions in Northern Much remains to be done to test all of the predictions of the theoretical model. In particular, it would be useful to collect detailed data on transactions completed at the market due to negotiation failures at the farm gate. Indeed, the data we use only describe the main farm gate transactions, meaning that we are not able to estimate the average impact on informed farmers who travel to the market. Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate a more dynamic framework in which average treatment eects are not constant through time because of traders' strategy adjustments. In particular, we may suppose that if the diusion of MIS is not uniform, meaning that MIS expands in some communities but not in others, the trader may well adapt to this information landscape.
Specically, he should seek to deal in uninformed communities when the market price is high, because in that case uninformed farmers, who systematically make incorrect estimates of the market price, agree to accept relatively low prices. On the contrary, the trader should visit informed communities when the market price is low, because it allows him to avoid costly negotiation failures. Note: Standard errors are in italics. Three asterisks *** (resp. **) denote rejection of the null hypothesis (att = 0) at the 1% (resp. 5%) signicance level. nnm is the nearest neighbor matching estimator, kernel is the kernel-based matching estimator, and llr the local linear matching estimator; x refers to the multivariate matching based on the distance between vectors Xi and Xj while ps refers to univariate matching based on the distance between propensity scores. The number of matches used for nnm can be 1 or 4. n is the sample size. Note: Standard errors are in italics. Three asterisks *** (resp. **) denote rejection of the null hypothesis (att = 0) at the 1% (resp. 5%) signicance level. nnm is the nearest neighbor matching estimator, kernel is the kernel-based matching estimator, and llr the local linear matching estimator; x refers to the multivariate matching based on the distance between vectors Xi and Xj while ps refers to univariate matching based on the distance between propensity scores. The number of matches used for nnm can be 1 or 4. n is the sample size. Note: Standard errors are in italics. Three asterisks *** (resp. **) denote rejection of the null hypothesis (att = 0) at the 1% (resp. 5%) signicance level. nnm is the nearest neighbor matching estimator, kernel is the kernel-based matching estimator, and llr the local linear matching estimator; x refers to the multivariate matching based on the distance between vectors Xi and Xj while ps refers to univariate matching based on the distance between propensity scores. The number of matches used for nnm can be 1 or 4. n is the sample size.
